When to Ally with Weak Partners by Overby, Mikkel Lucas
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.druid.dk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DRUID Working Paper No. 05-07 
 
 
Partner Selection Criteria in Strategic Alliances: 
When to Ally with Weak Partners 
 
By  
 
Mikkel Lucas Overby 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
www.druid.dk 
 
Partner Selection Criteria in Strategic Alliances:  
When to Ally with Weak Partners1  
 
Mikkel Lucas Overby  
 
Copenhagen Business School 
Njalsgade 80 
2300 Copenhagen S 
Denmark 
Email: mo.inf@cbs.dk 
 
 
Abstract:  
In many emergent markets, cross-industry alliances are necessary to develop and market new 
products and services. The resource-based view suggests that firms form alliances to access or 
acquire valuable, rare, non-imitable and non-substitutable resources, and that such access 
determines the level of profits. Hence, firms confronted with the choice between partners with 
strong versus partners with weak resource endowments should choose the former. We contest this 
view and argue that firms benefit from allying with weak partners at certain times. In essence, we 
suggest that partner selection involves assessing the relative importance of strong resource 
endowments and aligned strategic aspirations over time. By adopting an evolutionary approach, we 
show that appropriate partner selection criteria are dynamic and may involve allying with weak 
partners in the initial exploratory stage, with weak and/or strong partners in the development stage 
and with strong partners in the maturity stage. Our findings suggest that the resource-based 
understanding of strategic alliances should be extended to include a more profound role for a 
partner firm’s strategic aspiration. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Timing of market entry is critical for firms in most existing and emerging markets. As a 
market evolves, incumbents and new entrants must decide whether to develop and market 
products and services for new subfields early, to adopt a wait-and-see approach, or not to 
do it at all (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Mitchell, 1991). But entering technology-
intensive emerging markets requires intense collaboration with external partners (Doz & 
Hamel, 1998), because of time compression diseconomies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) or 
dissimilarity of activities (Richardson, 1972) and expertise (Powell, Koput, & Smith-
Doerr, 1996). In emerging markets, particularly cross-industry alliances have gained 
momentum recently, partly fuelled by learning benefits and the necessity of diverse capa-
bilities in converging markets (Lubatkin, Florin, & Lane, 2001). Thus, a vital question for 
firms upon entering an emerging market is how to decide who to ally with.  
While most work on strategic alliances has concentrated on why they form, as 
cited above, and some work on how they should be organized (Mjoen & Tallman, 1997) 
and when firms enter them (Powell & Brantley, 1992; Suarez-Villa, 1998), little research 
has focused on who firms ally with (Gulati, 1995). Yet, partner selection is an essential 
factor influencing the performance of alliances (Ariño & de la Torre, 1998; Ireland, Hitt, 
& Vaidyanath, 2002). Also, alliances can be sources competitive advantage (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998) and may “shift the very basis of competition to a new level – from firm vs. 
firm to (…) rival groupings of collaborators” (Powell, 1987: 68), which means that the 
performance of a firm is intimately tied to the performance of its collaborative engage-
ments (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). The resource-based view informs partner selection deci-
sions through its core claim that access to strong resources forms the basis for competi-
tive advantage. It follows that the greater a firm’s stock of resources, the greater the 
firm’s attractiveness to partners (Ahuja, 2000) and the normative advise to managers is 
therefore to seek allies with strong resource endowments in their respective markets. We 
challenge this general contention and argue that at times it is advantageous for firms to 
ally with weak partners in terms of their resource endowments but whose strategic aspira-
tions are strongly aligned with those of the central firm. Consider the following: Does it 
make sense to ally with Coca Cola, because it has a well-developed distribution system, if 
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Coke is not interested in deploying it in your interest to enter a new market? Does it make 
sense to ally with Nike, because its marketing skills are superior, if Nike will not give 
you access to these or deploy them to support your market entry? Does it make sense to 
ally with Sony, because of its skills in design and miniaturization, if Sony is not inter-
ested in these skills being utilized to your advantages? We believe not. However, it may 
make sense to ally with firms with less developed but sufficiently good distribution sys-
tems, marketing capabilities or miniaturization expertise if these firms genuinely aspire to 
develop and deploy their skills to the benefit of the alliance.  
Theory on partner selection in interfirm collaborations remains in general weak 
and more research is required to make it relevant for managers in particular contexts 
(Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; Geringer, 1991; Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 
2000; Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-Lindquist, & Borgatti, 1998). Jones et al. argue that we 
need more understanding of how alliance partners are chosen in multiparty collaborations 
among other issues in terms of “the criteria these selections are based upon” (1998: 408). 
The key question of this paper is how firms should select cross-industry alliance partners 
for entering new markets. Markets emerge every time the technological regime shifts, and 
at these points firms decide whether to offer a product or service that differs in some way 
from their current offerings (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). By adopting an evolutionary 
perspective, we show that the importance of different partner selection criteria changes 
over the course of the industry life cycle.  
We use the emergent European market for mobile internet services as an indica-
tive case study. A comparative analysis of alliance partner selection strategies of two key 
firms in the market is used as a reference point to illustrate the validity of our proposi-
tions. The case study method is chosen as it is appropriate for theory development (Yin, 
1989) in new topic areas (Eisenhardt, 1989). Data was extracted from secondary sources 
including annual reports, financial analyses, media announcements, and business press in 
general. This approach is widely used and suitable as all significant alliance relationships 
can be assumed to be reported in these media (e.g. Singh, 1997).   
The paper contributes to the strategic alliances literature on at least three ac-
counts. First, it extends the resource-based view by accentuating strategic aspirations as 
an additional criterion for the partner selection decision. Hereby, the paper also appends 
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to form a more context-depended resource-based perspective. Second, we link criteria for 
partner selection to the industry life cycle and propose that such criteria are dynamic with 
varying relative importance over time. By making this link, we also connect the choice of 
strategic posture - i.e. first-mover versus late entrant – to the partner selection criteria, 
claiming that these criteria may differ between firms with different entry strategies. 
Third, by abandoning a unilateral focus on resource endowments in favor of a broader 
focus encompassing aspiration levels we, on a practical level, derive more precise norma-
tive guidelines to managers regarding partner selection decisions. This may potentially 
assist in alleviating the reported unsatisfactory performance of strategic alliances (Bleek 
& Ernst, 1991; Kogut, 1988; Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Park & Ungson, 2001).1 
 
2. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
 
Research on strategic alliances has in broad terms departed from transaction cost 
economics (e.g. Hennart, 1988, 1991; Williamson, 1991) and the resource-based view of 
the firm (e.g. Das & Teng, 2000; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Transaction cost 
theory has successfully explained make-or-buy decision in relatively stable environments 
(e.g. Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986; Joskow, 1985; Masten, Meehan, & Snyder, 1991; 
Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Walker & Weber, 1984; Walker & Weber, 1987). However, 
it has difficulties explaining the organization of innovative activities in strategic alliances 
in rapidly changing environments, as engaging in small number bargaining in highly un-
certain settings runs counter to the transaction cost logic. Williamson (1994:85) acknowl-
edges that in transaction cost theory “network relations are given short shrift” and that 
innovation causes problems for the theory, why “added apparatus is needed” 
(Williamson, 1991: 293). Alternatively, the resource-based view suggests that firms seek 
to obtain control over resources that can be sources of competitive advantage 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). A firm’s propensity to engage in interfirm collaboration can be ex-
                                                 
1 Studies have included both objective failure measures such as survival, termination, duration, financial 
gains and subjective or measures including goal attainment, satisfaction, learning, competence building 
(Park and Ungson, 2001). Kale, Dyer and Singh (2002) find a positive correlation between objective and 
subjective measures. 
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plained by its need for access to such resources (Gulati, 1999; Harrigan, 1988; Nohria & 
Garcia-Pont, 1991). Das and Teng  note: “A resource-based view seems particularly ap-
propriate for examining strategic alliances because firms essentially use alliances to gain 
access to other firms’ valuable resources” (2000: 32-33).  
 
2.1 Criteria for Partner Selection in Current Literature 
The starting point of transaction cost analysis is not whom to partner with but rather how 
a particular exchange should be organized given certain exchange partners and exchange 
attributes (Williamson, 1985, 1991). Confronted with the partner selection choice, trans-
action cost theory suggests that firms choose allies by a comparative assessment of trans-
action costs involved in the specific relation. Implicitly, partner choice derives from 
economizing on the cost of contracting considering future contingencies. The resource-
based view provides insights about what kind of resources that may form the basis for an 
alliance and suggests that firms will benefit from allying with the firm holding the 
strongest complementary resources (e.g. Miotti & Sachwald, 2003), which can include 
various kinds from physical equipment over knowledge to reputational assets. In addition 
to seeking attractive partners, the firm must also itself have strong resource endowments 
(Kogut, Shan and Walker, 1992; Shan, Walker and Kogut, 1994; Ahuja, 2000). Hence, 
firms should conduct a comparative assessment of potential complementary partners’ re-
source bases and subsequently choose the strongest. The costs associated with accessing 
resources also matter, and firm will therefore choose the partner, who provides the best 
cost/benefit relation.  
Various other views on partner selection has emerged (Geringer, 1991; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Podolny, 1994; Saxon, 1997; Stuart, 1998). Among these a social per-
spective, following Granovetter’s (1985) critique of static efficiency theories in terms of 
“undersocialializing” the partner selection aspect, has recently received support. Gulati 
(1995) finds that prior alliances create ties that directly and indirectly influences the 
choice of partners. Similarly, Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) find that the probability of a 
new alliance between two specific firms increases with their interdependence, their prior 
ties, common third parties and their centrality in the alliance network. Li & Rowley 
(2002) find that in addition to different evaluation criteria, inertia plays an important role 
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in partner selection. Both Gulati (1995), Li & Rowley (2002) and Gulati & Gargiulo 
(1999) focus on intra-industry alliances.2 However, entry alliances in emerging markets 
often involve firms from different industries, which, because of industrial separated pasts, 
may not have any previous direct ties and merely insignificant indirect ties.  
 
2.2 Insufficiency of Current Theories 
Resource-based theory aims to address which assets should be brought together, whereas 
transaction cost theory informs about how these assets should be brought together. For 
this reason, transaction cost economics does not inform the specifics around selection cri-
teria. The resource-based explanation offers some managerial guidance, but the proposed 
prescriptions are problematic for several reasons. First, the general argument that strong 
resources in the relevant market equals and attractive partner is too simplistic. A growing 
literature developed by Joseph Schumpeter (1934) and pioneered by Clayton Christensen 
(1997) documents the failure of leading firms, signaling that allying with the strongest 
firm may not always be the best strategy. Second, the resource-based view is not very 
context-sensitive (notable exceptions are Miller & Shamsie (1996) and Brush & Artz 
(1999)), yet, context is very important for partner selection (Geringer, 1991; Mahnke, 
2001). Third, it views the possession of critical resources as a primary reason (Hitt et al., 
2000) and even prerequisite for alliance formation (Das et al., 2000) and consequently 
pays less attention to alternative parameters. In sum, the resource-based contribution to 
the alliance literature has focused on the static properties of firm’s existing resource en-
dowments and hence implicitly adopted simplifying assumptions of constant or neutral 
levels of alternative explanatory variables.  
 
3. ASPIRATION LEVELS AND THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE  
 
Current research addresses partner selection, because it affects the mix of resources and 
capabilities available to the alliance. Yet, it is not necessarily the critically of resources 
(Barney, 1991) that determines the attractiveness of a partner. Spekman (1988) claims 
                                                 
2 Gulati notes that “A useful extension of this research would examine both cross-industry and intraindustry 
alliances within a single unifying framework” (1995: 646). 
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that selection of a good partner heavily depends on goal congruence between partners. 
Taking the argument further Hamel, Doz & Prahalad (1989) argue that when seeking col-
laborators for technology-related projects, firms should seek partners whose strategic 
goals converge, while their competitive goals diverge. Koza and Lewin  (2000) argue that 
on of the most common reason for alliances to fail is lack of recognition of the close in-
terplay between the overall strategy of the firm and the role of an alliance in that strategy. 
We suggest that the aspiration level of a firm to enter a particular technical subfield of an 
emerging market with its resources - weak or strong - is an important criterion for partner 
selection. Strong and aligned strategic aspirations are positively related to cooperative 
behavior and thus partner selection (Axelrod, 1984). The degree of this aspiration for en-
try is primarily determined by the expected relative changes in the demand for a firms 
products upon entering a new market – its shadow of the future (Dasgupta & Stiglitz, 
1980; Klepper, 1996). Different firms will have different potential gains from entering a 
market, which make it advantageous for some firms to enter a market at one point in 
time, whereas others will find it unattractive at this point. Incumbents and potential new 
entrants are for instance likely to act strategically different as market entry for incum-
bents will cannibalize revenue streams as existing customers will migrate to the new seg-
ment, whereas entry for new-comers allows for additional revenue streams (Reinganum, 
1985).3 Thus, incumbents may not have the incentive (Geroski, 1995) or the choice to 
enter early as the demand of their existing customers shape’s the allocation of resources, 
which may mean that they foreclose new opportunities (Christensen & Bower, 1996). 
Mitchell (1991) concludes that incumbents will perform better if they postpone entry 
until new entrants have tested the products and markets, and Afuah and Utterback (1997) 
note that market leaders may retrench to attempt to prolong the viability of their 
established positions for as long as possible. Such behavioral differences will fit to differ-
ent degrees with the strategic aspirations of the firm seeking an ally. These considerations 
are important for partner selection in markets, where entry cannot be made by a single 
firm but necessitates coordination of entry strategies across firms in an alliance.  
                                                 
3 Not all existing customers migrate instantly and often product and service generations co-exist for periods 
of time, yet this is less important for the argument here.  
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The argument links to the resource-based view, which contends that within an in-
dustry firms with different pre-entry resources have aspiration to enter at different points 
in time (e.g. Mitchell, 1989; Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). The valuation of net benefits 
from entry is thus not independent from, but also not solely determined by, the existence 
and utilization of a firm’s resources. Incumbents and new entrants typically have differ-
ent resource endowments as incumbents have adjusted their resources to the industry set-
ting and build knowledge of the particular market, which the new entrants have not. Be-
cause industry-specific resources and routines of new entrants are less well developed, 
the resource endowments of incumbents in general tend to be strongest. This naturally 
depends on whether the emerging market is based on competence-enhancing or compe-
tence-destroying technologies (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). However, for our argument 
this distinction is less essential as we merely advocate for a more profound role for aspi-
ration levels. The implication for partner selection is that despite the fact that a firm has 
attractive resources in a market, it may not be an attractive partner as its aspirations to 
deploy the resources in accordance with the strategic desires of the central firm may be 
insignificant. In addition, firms with strongly aligned entrance aspirations may be more 
inclined to make alliance-specific investments, which are associated with higher per-
formance (Dyer, 1996).   
 
3.1 Relative Importance of Resources and Aspirations 
In general, it is attractive for firms to ally with partners that have strong resource endow-
ments and great aspiration to enter the market and unattractive to ally with weak firms 
with low aspirations. However, a dilemma surfaces when the attractive combination is 
not available in the partner market and firms must decide whether to ally with firms with 
strong resource endowments and then make the aspiration strength a secondary criterion 
or whether to ally with firms that have great aspirations to enter and make the resource 
strength a secondary criterion? None of these options implies that “anything goes” for the 
second criterion. Naturally, firms should not ally with partners that have either fully op-
posite aspirations or totally insufficient resources in terms of the aim of the alliance. 
Rather secondary criteria imply sufficient aspiration alignment or sufficient resource en-
dowments to support market entry. The four different situations arising from categorizing 
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potential partners according to their resource endowments and their strategic aspirations 
are portrayed in table 1.  
 
Table 1: Partner Selection Criteria and Alliance Categories 
 Great aspiration Low aspiration 
Strong resources (1) Attractive alliances (2) Resource-based alliances 
Weak resources (3) Aspiration-based alliances (4) Unattractive alliances 
 
4. EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE ON PARTNER SELECTION CRITERIA 
 
A firm will ally with another only if it foresee a probability of future strategically or fi-
nancially benefits from the collaboration (Stuart, 1998). These benefits can stem from the 
resource endowments of the other firm or its aspiration to achieve a certain objective. The 
partner selection decision involves a comparative assessment of these two factors across 
potential allies. However, the importance of each criterion is likely to change over time. 
Linking motivations for forming alliances to each distinctive stage in a development 
process has not been undertaken (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Similarly, no effort has 
been made to link motives to the product life-cycle. To account for these changes in crite-
ria we utilize life cycle reasoning and a three-stage entry game with an early exploratory 
stage, an intermediate development stage, and a maturity stage (Williamson, 1975).  
From the firm’s perspective, initially when a market is formed it must decide on 
whether to enter, and if so, the timing of entry. When balancing the risks of premature 
entry and the costs of missed opportunities, the firms that value the net potential as high 
will have a stronger aspiration to enter than those who value it to be low (Lilien & Yoon, 
1990). The underlying reason motivating entry, however, changes over the industry life 
cycle (Agerwal & Audretsch, 2001). Thus, deciding not to enter early in the life cycle 
does not imply that the firm will refrain from participating in market-entry-alliances be-
fore this stage for strategic reasons. For firms, contemplating on entering emerging mar-
kets, where allying is necessary for entry, it is important to avoid such alliance partners. 
Hence, in order to make appropriate partner selection decisions they must not only assess 
the resource endowments of potential allies but also understand how they will value the 
potential of entering and how this valuation may change over time.  
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4.1 Partner Selection Criteria in the Exploratory Stage  
The early phase of an industry life cycle, when the market is still emerging, represents by 
definition a change from status quo. It is characterized by high degree of both technology 
and market uncertainty (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and requires product or service innova-
tions from the firms participating in creating the market. Resources forming the basis for 
previous competitive advantages may not be valuable in the emergent market if changes 
are competence-destroying (Tushman et al., 1986) and hence uncertainty about what the 
right and what the wrong resources are prevails. Thus, early entrants face the risk of be-
ing displaced in the market, because of wrong or unlucky technical or market choices. 
Under these conditions, there are three key reasons why aspiration levels may 
take precedence over resource endowments as criterion for partner selection. First, an 
emergent market represents a change from status quo, and firms that have been successful 
in the previous market may not want things to change. Thus, firms, which, as a result of 
their success, have strong resource endowments, may expend resources to deter entry and 
market development. They may do this by entering into alliances only to learn and to de-
lay the development of the new market, so they can extract the remaining profits from the 
existing market. In addition, firms with strong resources may refrain from early entry and 
wait until initial uncertainties have been resolved because they are confident that they 
have the strength (such as financial resources for heavy marketing spending) to capture 
the market even in late entry. Strong firms can also seek to reduce risks by adopting an 
option perspective on entry decisions (Miller & Folta, 2002). While this may be advanta-
geous for the firm in question, it is not in the interest of a potential partner, as it implies 
less than full commitment. Second, early entry involves risks due to high uncertainty 
about technologies and future demand and firms with strong aspirations are more inclined 
to take risky actions than firms with strong resource endowments. Firms with strong re-
source endowments often have a valuable brand name and hence have more to loose from 
taking risky actions than firms with no brand name. Sullivan (1991) found that because 
brand equity is a key resource for incumbents they tend to enter later than new-name 
brands. Moreover, extension of brands with large customer bases to new technical sub-
field typically happens later than extension of brands whose base is small. Third, in the 
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early phase rapid adaptation to change is an essential competitive parameter. Firms with 
strong resource endowments may be unable to quickly adapt to change (Henderson & 
Clark, 1990) as they typically are large, which in general makes them less adaptable but 
also because they may have developed certain routines that are not easily adjustable 
(Nelson et al., 1982). Several authors argue that there is a negative correlation between 
weak resource bases and post-entry survival rates (Geroski, 1995; Helfat et al., 2002). 
However, this is not necessarily important as partners can function as “stepping-stones” 
by facilitating early entry and then being replaced over the course of the industry life cy-
cle if desired. In sum, we argue that firms wishing to enter an emergent market should not 
choose its ally primarily on the basis of its stock of resources but rather on the degree and 
strength of aligned aspiration levels.   
 
P1: In the exploratory stage the strength of aspiration levels is a more important crite-
rion for partner selection than the strength of resource endowments 
 
4.2 Partner Selection Criteria in the Maturity Stage 
Firms contemplating on market entry in the maturity stage face a different competitive 
environment than the early movers. In the maturity stage technology and market uncer-
tainty have been resolved and few changes take place in the market.4 Established cus-
tomer connections stabilize the rate of change of market shares of the largest firms in the 
industry (Agerwal et al., 2001; Klepper, 1996), while reduced uncertainty intensifies 
competition between the firms in the market (Afuah et al., 1997). In this stage firms that 
remain on the market will be determined to stay, and as growth rated decline and some 
firms do better than others, some exits the market, not voluntarily but because they are 
forced to. Whereas product innovations and improvements of functionalities are impor-
tant in the exploratory stage, in the maturity stage process innovations and cost reductions 
for the end-customers are central (Adner & Levinthal, 2001; Klepper, 1996). The matur-
ity stage persists or is replaced by a decline phase where the demand decreases and may 
fall to zero.  
                                                 
4 Naturally the maturity stage ends with uncertainty as a new exploratory growth stage in an emergent mar-
ket will replace it.  
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 In such an environment firms with strong resource endowments may be better al-
lies than those with strong aspiration levels. This is first because the market structure al-
lows the strong firms to remain strong until the next disruptive change occurs (Klepper, 
1996). Intensified competition among defined players makes resource strengths increas-
ingly important. Notably, however, the strong firms in this stage are not necessarily the 
same as the strong firms in the exploratory stage. Second, the incentive to innovate is 
manifested differently for process and product innovation. Product innovations attract 
new buyers, and hence the incentive for product innovation is conditioned by the demand 
of new buyers. In contrast, process innovation, which is more important in this phase, 
typically lowers a firm’s average cost of production and the value of such a reduction is 
proportional to the total output of the firm, the incentive to engage in process innovation 
is greatest for the largest firms (Klepper, 1996). Thus, it makes most sense for strong firm 
to engage in process innovation and thus thrive in this stage. In sum, the aspiration levels 
of firms in the maturity stage become a less important criterion for partner selection. In-
stead it is important to ally with firms that have the strength in terms of resources and ca-
pabilities to stay on the market.  
 
P2: In the maturity stage the strength of aspiration levels is a less important criterion for 
partner selection than the strength of resource endowments 
 
4.3 Partner Selection Criteria in the Development Stage 
In between the exploratory and the maturity stages lies the development stage. In this 
phase the technical subfield has evolved and dominant designs and standardized tech-
nologies are emerging (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). Hence, given that a product suc-
ceeds and makes it to the development stage, uncertainty will be reduced compared to the 
growth phase but higher than in the maturity stage. This implies that the potential for 
seizing significant new market shares is reduced – yet not disappeared. At first, few firms 
will supply the products, but entry then expands as demand rises resulting in output in-
creases and price falls. In the development stage the competitive imperative is neither 
market exploration nor market exploitation but staying in and developing the market. 
This does not eliminate the importance of product innovations, as the market still needs 
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to be expanded, but in the particular subfield process innovations becomes relatively 
more important (Klepper, 1996).  
 In this competitive environment firms that are present on the market have proven 
their aspiration to enter the new subfield. Moreover, strategically slowing down market 
development through alliance participation is no longer possible. With limited threat of 
opportunistic alliance participation what becomes increasingly important is whether po-
tential partners have the resource endowments to stay. Thus, while the relative high im-
portance of aspiration levels decreases, the relative low importance of resource endow-
ments in contrast increases. There may be both advantages and disadvantages associated 
with allying with strong resource-based firms versus strong aspiration-based firms in the 
development phase as success requires market expansion through product innovation as 
well as efficiency through process innovations, which the two types of firms are likely to 
support differently. As a result neither aspiration levels nor resource endowments take 
precedence, which may result in partner selection decision being based on alternative cri-
teria.  
 
P3: In the development stage the strength of aspiration levels and the strength of re-
source endowments assume equal importance for partner selection 
 
Note that we do not claim that firms with strong resource endowments necessarily have 
low aspiration levels for market entry or vice versa. Our arguments only pertain to the 
prioritization of partner selection criteria. The above discussion and propositions are 
graphically summarized in figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The Relative Importance of Resources and Aspirations 
 
 
 
5. MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATION MARKET 
 
The mobile telecommunication market provides an ideal reference setting for assessing 
the validity of our arguments. The emerging market for data-intensive services empha-
sizes the necessity for cross-industry alliances involving network operators, handset 
manufactures, application developers and content providers to secure growing revenue 
streams. In addition, the market is technology-intensive and life-cycles are relatively easy 
to identify. We focus on the Western European market, which historically has been the 
world’s most important mobile communication market - albeit Japan and South Korea 
lately have taken lead positions. Within this market we concentrate on alliances involving 
the two most influential segments: network operators and handset manufactures.  
Provision of data-intensive services has been made possible through develop-
ments in the carrier technology, which facilitates network traffic and is the defining char-
acter of base stations and handsets. Carrier technologies have evolved through their first 
and second generation and the third generation is currently being rolled out in Europe. 
While the first and second generation was mainly used for voice and simple services, the 
2.5G (GPRS) technology enabled provision of data-intensive services. 2.5G is merely a 
technological extension of 2G (GSM) and most handsets on the market were 2.5G com-
patible. 3G (UMTS) increases the bandwidth and speed in service provisioning, but it 
does not allow for significant new services, except video-telephony. Importantly, how-
ever, the technology differs from the previous and thus requires new handsets. Hence, 
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whereas 2.5G placed new demands on operators in terms of upgraded networks and on 
handset manufactures who have to offer new functionalities and user interfaces, 3G am-
plifies the requirements. This has created an unseen level interdependence among market 
players and forced particularly handset manufactures and network operators to form stra-
tegic alliances at an unprecedented pace. The greatest challenge is not the technology be-
hind advanced handsets, but in making interoperable handsets and networks. Thus, exten-
sive interoperability tests between each network and terminal manufacturer is among 
other things required.5 
 
5.1 Operator and Handset Alliances 
In this section we comparatively analyze the alliance strategies of two “flagship firms” 
(Whalley, 2004) in the European network operating market, the new entrant “3” and the 
incumbent Vodafone, in terms of their selection of handset manufacturing partners. 
 
5.1.1 “3”’s Alliance Strategy 
On October 2nd 2002, “3”, owned by Hong Kong based Hutchison Whampoa, launched 
its 3G services in the UK and became the first 3G network operator in the European mar-
ket. “3” was a new entrant in the European market with no customers and no existing net-
works.6 It had an explicit strategy of being a first-mover in the new technical subfield of 
3G, which differed from its competitors, who had postponed their launch due to technical 
errors and the lack of compatible handsets.7 Many competitors including Vodafone, O2, 
T-Mobile and Orange argued that the system did not work and that a premature launch 
would create bad publicity for the 3G market as a whole. “3” on the other hand hoped to 
achieve first-mover advantages and to sell their phones at high prices due to their initial 
monopoly position. The firm invested an estimated $12 billion to buy 3G licenses in 10 
countries in 2000-2001. Its European presence include Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, 
the UK and Sweden, which should generate synergies through cross country work with 
                                                 
5 Global Telephony: “The Handset Bottleneck”, October 2001, 9/9, p. 31-32. 
6 Some of the different “3” subsidiaries are formed with partners established in Europe and the mother-
company Hutchinson Whampoa has previous experience from other telecommunication ventures in Europe 
e.g. the formation of Orange. However, these facts are less important here.  
7 Børsen, September 10 2002. 
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try work with technology and infrastructure and the exchange of ideas for services and 
price models.8  
As a network operator, “3” was not able to enter the market without partnering 
with handset manufactures that would develop compatible 3G handsets. However, in-
cumbent handset manufactures in the European market were reluctant to launch 3G 
phones in accordance with the time schedule of “3”. Nokia for instance did not want to 
introduce a phone with video-calling facility and thus did not offer a way for “3” to dis-
tinguish its offerings as it pleased.9 Rather than allying with the European incumbents, 
“3” established close cooperation with US Motorola (July 2001) and Japanese NEC (Au-
gust 2001) to facilitate the closely coordinated development of terminals and services for 
ensuring perfect compatibility. The firm did not dismiss the idea of having other handsets 
for their services but emphasized that the handset is an integrated part of the user experi-
ence and thus “3” would be very cautious with its partners.10 In April 2004, one and a 
half year after the first 3G phone was introduced to the market, “3” UK announced that it 
would be selling the first 3G phone from Nokia - the 7600. However, “3” and Nokia did 
not form a partnership and the 7600 was not exclusively offered to “3”. In May 2004, “3” 
in contrast allied with LG Electronics of Korea, which joined Motorola and NEC as pre-
ferred 3G handset providers. LG was to supply 3 million UMTS terminals to the “3” 
group by the end of 2004. The first videophone for LG Electronics produced exclusively 
for 3, LG U8110, was sold in Italy from May 2004. In 2004, “3” ordered around eight 
million 3G handsets from its three preferred providers and expects to buy 12 million 
handsets for 2005.11 
 
5.1.2 Vodafone’s Alliance Strategy 
UK-based Vodafone is the world’s largest telecommunication company and one of the 
world’s largest firms by market capitalization. In October 2002, the same time when “3” 
marketed its 3G services, Vodafone launched its 2.5G service platform Vodafone Live!.12  
                                                 
8 Financial Times, “The Wrong Call?”, December 4 2003, p. 21. 
9 Financial Times, “The Finnish Company has Dominated Mobile Telecoms…”, May 7 2004, p. 17. 
10 Børsen, April 8 2003. 
11 www.3gnewsroom.com, “Hutchison to order 12 million 3G handsets for next year”, September 12 2004. 
12 Interestingly, Utterback and Kim (1986) showed, innovations in an older technology may not come be-
fore the threat of the invading technology is a reality. 
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Three handsets were offered at launch: Sharp GX10; Panasonic GD87; and Nokia 7650. 
However, Vodafone surprised the industry by choosing Sharp, then a virtually unknown 
mobile brand in Europe, as the flagship handset provider. However, Sharp was more will-
ing to cede to Vodafone’s demands to produce a phone meeting its specific requirements. 
The strategy worked, with the Sharp phone becoming a top-selling handset in Europe in 
2003.13 The Nokia handset was not emphasized in advertising and nor by analysts exem-
plified by CSFB that noted “The new Sharp and Panasonic terminals are a good start and 
Vodafone has said that a number of other new Vodafone Live! terminals are in the Pipe-
line” (Credit Suisse First Boston, 2002), leaving Nokia unmentioned. As a result the 
Nokia handset represented less than 20 percent of the sold Vodafone Live! handsets by 
November 2003 (Credit Suisse First Boston, 2003). In the summer 2003, Vodafone 
placed orders with several unnamed Japanese manufacturers for several millions 3G mo-
bile phones, passing over the industry-leading Nokia, as Nokia models were not offering 
the features Vodafone wanted. The firm instead enlisted Samsung and Sony Ericsson to 
provide handsets for the service, but hoped to expand its range in the coming months.14  
Vodafone spent $23 billion acquiring 10 3G licenses in Europe. However, its 
CEO Mr. Sarin complained about the unavailability of 3G handsets at the 3GSM mobile 
summit in Cannes. He argued that Vodafone's 3G networks and services were ready, but 
it was continuing to wait for handsets that were not bulky, overheating or that had poor 
battery life. Thus, even though “3” in 2004 started having some success selling bulky 3G 
phones on cheap voice tariffs, Mr Sarin said Vodafone would wait until 3G handsets 
were “superior” to 2G as Vodafone could afford to disappoint its customers. Other lead-
ing operators voiced similar complaints that the devices did not match current 2G and 
2.5G phones and all have indicated their full 3G launches will be delayed until.15 Nokia’s 
CEO Mr. Ollila responded by saying that Nokia had suffered from a chicken-and-egg 
situation in its development of 3G handsets. It had to have three or four stable networks 
available to test the devices and the complexity of 3G meant the process had taken a long 
time. Not before May 2004 did Vodafone launch its first full 3G mobile services in Por-
tugal and Germany. The firm developed strong relationships with handset manufactures 
                                                 
13 Financial Times, “The Finnish Company has Dominated Mobile Telecoms…”, May 7 2004, p. 17. 
14 BBC News, May 4 2004. 
15 Financial Times, “Mobile Makers Return Fire in 3G Row”, February 26 2004, p. 18. 
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including Nokia, Siemens, Ericsson, Motorola and Casio to ensure delivery of 3G mobile 
devises in various forms (Dodourova, 2003). 
 
5.2 Resources and Aspirations of Handset Producers 
The mobile handset market is rather concentrated as few firms dominate the industry at a 
global level and even fewer are controlling the European market. On a global scale 
Nokia, Motorola, Samsung, Siemens, Sony Ericsson, and LG Electronics accounted for 
80-85 percent of worldwide sales in Q2 2004 (see table 2). Although the same firms 
dominate the European market, the picture differs as European handset manufactures are 
much stronger in their home region than globally. Globally, the largest market shares are 
distributed among one European (Nokia), one American (Motorola) and one Asian (Sam-
sung) firm, whereas the top three manufactures in Europe – Nokia, Siemens and Sony 
Ericsson - all have European roots (see table 3).  
 
Table 2: Global Quarterly Handset Market Shares 2002-2004 
Year Quarter Nokia Motorola Samsung Siemens SEMC LG Others Top 6 
2002 Q1 36.7% 15.8% 10.6% 9.2% 6.4% 3.4% 17.9% 82.1% 
  Q2 36.7% 17.0% 8.2% 8.4% 5.5% 3.8% 20.4% 79.6% 
  Q3 36.3% 16.7% 11.5% 7.6% 4.9% 4.4% 18.6% 81.4% 
  Q4 38.3% 18.3% 9.7% 9.2% 5.9% 3.9% 14.7% 85.3% 
2003 Q1 37.6% 16.7% 13.2% 8.0% 5.4% 5.6% 13.5% 86.5% 
  Q2 39.0% 15.0% 11.4% 7.7% 6.4% 5.0% 15.3% 84.7% 
  Q3 36.0% 16.2% 12.0% 9.6% 5.7% 6.1% 14.5% 85.5% 
  Q4 36.9% 14.9% 10.3% 10.1% 5.3% 5.9% 16.5% 83.5% 
2004 Q1 31.7% 17.9% 14.3% 9.1% 6.2% 6.2% 14.6% 85.4% 
  Q2 30.3% 16.1% 15.1% 6.9% 6.9% 6.6% 18.0% 82.0% 
Source: Kaufman Bros Equity Research, 2004 
 
Table 3: European Handset Market Shares 2002-2003 
Year Quarter Nokia Siemens SEMC Motorola Samsung Others Top 5 
2002 Q2 50.3% 13.4% 10.8% 9.8% 4.4% 11.5% 88.5% 
2003 Q2 53.4% 13.2% 8.8% 8.4% 4.7% 11.5% 88.5% 
Source: “European Mobile Phone Market Struggles as Nokia and Samsung Make Slight Gains”, 
www.idc.com. September 5th 2003. 
 
 18
Nokia is by far the largest handset producer reaching a global market share of 39 
percent and over 50 percent share in Europe. Nokia has several resources that make it an 
attractive partner including the largest installed base of customers, high brand awareness 
and value, highly developed and well-functioning distribution system, proven R&D and 
marketing skills, strong influence in terms of standard setting, and the financial resources 
to back almost any initiative. Credit Suisse First Boston noted that “With around 50% of 
the European handset market, Nokia’s support for new initiatives is crucial” (2002: 9). 
However, neither “3” nor Vodafone allied with the market leader, Nokia, when they en-
tered the market for data-intensive mobile services. While Nokia had very strong re-
source endowments in the European market, it had no strategic aspiration to enter the 
market for 3G phones in the early exploratory stage or to customize 2.5G phones for cer-
tain operators. It was shipping large quantities of its 2G/2.5G “candy-bar” phones and 
would neither cannibalize its sales by offering alternative products nor jeopardize its 
market leader position by entering a new and immature technological regime. Moreover, 
the initial scale of the emerging 3G market was simply too small for Nokia to enter the 
market.  
Siemens, with the second largest market share in Europe, formed a R&D alliance 
with Japanese Toshiba to develop 3G handset in 2000. However, in December 2001 To-
shiba backed out of the deal.16 Instead Siemens agreed with Motorola that Motorola will 
make UMTS phones for Siemens in 2002 and 2003 based on Motorola’s A820 model un-
til Siemens in 2004 should be able to produce its own handsets.17 In this regard Financial 
Times noted: “This is a further sign that only a handful of companies are on target to 
supply 3G compatible handsets in any significant numbers this year”.18 Siemens obvi-
ously lacked research and development capabilities to produce 3G handsets; however, it 
possessed other key resources such as local market knowledge and established distribu-
tion and marketing systems. Still, there has been no discussion about Siemens allying 
with an early moving network operator in the European market. 
                                                 
16 Europemedia: “Japanese Toshiba backs out on 3G Handset Deal with German Siemens”, December 6 
2001. 
17 Wireless, ”Motorola Phones Dressed in Siemens’ Clothing”, April 22 2002, p. 14. 
18 Financial Times, ”Siemens to Resell Motorola Handsets”, April 16 2002, p. 28. 
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Sony Ericsson marketed its first 3G handset, the Z1010, in June 2004. Katsumi 
lhara, president of Sony Ericsson, admitted it had experienced difficulties in stabilizing 
the hardware and software in what he refers to as a “very complex new technology”.19 
Thus, again, the firm may have lacked advanced research and development skills but its 
strong presence and the associated competencies plus the unique combination of knowl-
edge from the European and Japanese markets made it appear as a strong partner. 
Comparatively, Motorola was a global leader in 1995 with a 60 percent market 
share. Yet, in 2003 its market share had dropped to 15 percent. It has been argued that 
Motorola failed because “it misread consumer preferences, alienated telecom companies, 
and stumbled in developing new products” (Tulsian, 2004). Motorola was the first hand-
set manufacture to ally with “3”. For Motorola the partnership was a good way of pursu-
ing its ambitious goal of increasing its European market share from 10 to 20 percent from 
2003 to 2004. Motorola Nordic mentioned that “3” is highly prioritized, because “3” 
drives the Nordic 3G market.20  
Japan’s NEC was once a major player in Europe’s mobile market, but the firm 
was slow to build phones for the GSM networks that emerged in the 1990s. Conse-
quently, NEC, which ranked sixth in units sold in Europe in 1995, saw its market share 
collapse, and pulled out of Europe.21 With little market share and a potentially large 3G 
market in Europe, NEC regarded allying with “3” as an attractive opportunity to penetrate 
the market. “We hope 3G will allow us to become a top three player in the world again” 
said Hideyuki Tsunoda, general manager of NEC's mobile terminals division. Jenny 
Nielson NEC’s Nordic marketing director commented that NEC has high expectations for 
the market, because it is among the first on the market.  
Sharp did not have any significant presence in Europe before it allied with Voda-
fone. In April 2001, Sharp Telecommunications of Europe Ltd. was established in order 
to bring 2.5G Sharp GSM/GPRS mobile phones to the European market. Although Asian 
handset producers such as NEC and Sharp potentially had knowledge advantages in terms 
of 3G handset requirements from their home markets, a comparison with the European 
incumbents made them look as inadequate contesters. They basically lacked what was 
                                                 
19 Financial Times, ”The Next Generation Finally comes of Age ”, February 18 2004, Survey Edition, p. 1. 
20 Børsen, January 21 2003. 
21 Wall Street Journal Asia, August 29 2002, p. 4. 
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considered the key resource-based advantages of Nokia such as locked-in installed cus-
tomer bases, highly valued brand names, well-established distribution systems, proven 
marketing skills, and general knowledge of the European market.  
Very limited information is available about the partner selection decisions in the 
development and maturity stages, as the market today is merely on the verge to the de-
velopment stage. However, it is worth noticing that the strong European handset manu-
factures are now entering the 3G market. “3” offers both a Sony Ericsson and a Nokia 
handset but no alliance has been formed in terms of co-development, co-branding or ex-
clusivity. Vodafone, on the other hand, entered the 3G subfield relatively late and imme-
diately established close relationship with the strong handset manufactures in the market.  
In sum, there appears to be a pattern in the entry decision within the European 
handset manufacturing market. Nokia, Siemens and Sony Ericsson generally appeared as 
the strongest firms in terms of resource endowments on the European market although 
Siemens and Sony-Ericsson may have had insufficient R&D skills in terms of 3G. How-
ever, it was Motorola, NEC and Sharp, all relatively weak firms in this market, which 
entered in the exploratory stage through partnering with “3” and Vodafone. The three 
weaker handset manufactures had strong strategic aspirations for entering the European 
market as their net potential gains were high. Thus, “3” through allying with Motorola 
and NEC and Vodafone through its alliance with Sharp in the very early stage of the in-
dustry life cycle were enabled to enter the market.  
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 
An essential but often neglected issue in strategic alliance research is the partner selection 
decision. Transaction cost economics emphasizes cost minimization as the rationale for 
strategic alliances, but Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) criticize the approach for its 
static efficiency focus and argue that an extended resource-based view is better capable 
of capturing the strategic rationales of interfirm collaboration. However, when it comes to 
explaining partner selection decisions, the resource-based perspective may be subject to 
similar criticism, as it focuses on static resource endowments of firms. Our explanation 
for partner selection links to the resource-based view. However, we extend the theory by 
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adopting an evolutionary approach and confront what we believe to be the key question 
in terms of partner selection: Should partner selection be based primarily on potential 
partners’ resource endowments and secondly on their aspiration levels in terms of using 
these in certain ways, or should firms give primary attention to the aspiration levels and 
focus on the resource endowments secondly? The resource-base view, implicitly suggests 
the former by neglecting the aspiration issue. The reason for this may be that it implicitly 
assumes that aspirations are aligned in strategic alliances. Use of resources, according to 
original resource-based reasoning, involves internalization and not merely access to an 
external partner’s resource base (Barney, 1986). When firms internalize resources, aspira-
tion becomes less important, because a single entity remains. However, access to re-
sources can be accomplished through strategic alliances (Grant & Baden Fuller, 2004), 
which preserves separate entities and also different strategic aspirations. 
 In answering the question, we develop three propositions from which theoretical 
implications and testable hypothesis can be derived. Key to the propositions is an evolu-
tionary perspective purporting that it may at times be appropriate for a firm to ally with 
weak partners in terms of their resource endowments if its strategic aspirations are 
strongly aligned with the interest of the central firm. An interesting implication of our 
argument is that when aspirations of allies are aligned, bargaining power arguments loose 
importance. Thus, when firms choose to ally with firms, with whom they have common 
strategic aspirations, bargaining and opportunism problems should diminish. This is im-
portant as an increasing number of alliances involve links between smaller entrepreneu-
rial firms and larger established firms (Doz, 1988; Miotti et al., 2003). 
Generally, our case study supports that resource endowments are neither the sin-
gle nor necessarily the most important criteria for partner selection decision in the 
exploratory stage. However, our findings tell little about criteria in the subsequent stages. 
Strong firms enter the market in the development stage but little allying takes place. We 
may suspect that it potentially is unnecessary to enter alliances in this stage, first, because 
coordinated market entrance is no longer required, but also because unstructured techni-
cal dialogue and overlapping problem solving (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Monteverde, 
1995) is less vital due to the emergence of standards and modular interfaces (Robertson 
& Langlois, 1995). In the cases discussed it is difficult to evaluate the “appropriateness” 
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of the criteria for partner selection decisions as the performance of “3” and Vodafone’s 
alliance strategies is intricate to assess. First, because limited time has pasted since the 
strategies were implemented. The market is still characterized by uncertainty and the per-
formance implications may not have materialized yet. Second, there are no competitors to 
compare with. Both “3” and Vodafone has been criticized for their huge spending on 3G 
licenses combined with the slow service uptake in the market. Yet, lately many voices are 
recognizing that “3” is rapidly gaining market shares and has signed up 3.2 million sub-
scribers globally. Also Vodafone’s Live! portal has recently experienced a significant up-
take. However, whether “3” and Vodafone will benefit from their alliance strategies, and 
to which degree such benefits will also be available to later-entering competitors, remains 
to be seen. Thus, the results of this study are very indicative. Yet, we can conclude that 
by allying with partners with relatively weak resource endowments “3” succeeded in be-
ing the first-mover in the emergent market and is rapidly seizing market shares and Voda-
fone succeeded being the first operator to launch an extensive 2.5G service platform for 
data-intensive services. 
Financial Times in a special report (December 5 2000) wrote: “It is a measure of 
how far they have slipped that many of the leading Japanese and Korean manufacturers 
are choosing to team up with weaker European players to help crack the international 
market”. This statement reflects a general fallacy, namely that allying with weak partners 
is necessarily a sign of weakness. We provide a framework emphasizing the changing 
relative importance of resource endowments and aligned aspiration levels in partner se-
lection decisions. Yet, more work is needed to outline the specific relationship among 
these variables over time. Also the variables “resource strength” and “aspiration levels” 
need to be measured more stringently as we simplify our analysis by using market share 
and selected key resources to form a measure of resource strength and a firm’s potential 
net gains from market entry as a measure of the aspiration level. We also concentrate on 
dyadic relationships. However, in dyadic relationships there is more often harmony be-
tween private and common benefits as aspirations are relatively easy to align for the part-
ners’ specific purpose compared to multifirm alliances. Thus, aspirations may have more 
importance in multifirm alliances than it is argued in this paper. Furthermore, we only 
present indicative empirical data from newspaper articles, case studies and financial re-
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ports, which is not the kind of systemic investigation preferable. However, the tendency 
to form cross-industry alliances for entry in emergent markets is relatively new as it is 
often driven by digital convergence. This makes it difficult to take a more systemic ap-
proach, which would require a comparative assessment of the performance of alliances, 
where the firms involved deployed aspiration- and resource-based criteria for partner se-
lection versus the performance of alliances that involved firms only focusing on resource 
endowments. However, many studies indirectly show that firms are not taking strategic 
aspirations properly into account when selecting allies. Thus, while it is a challenge to 
identify a sufficient number of firms deploying the two different methods to do empirical 
testing, we sincerely believe that current theory is unadvisable to use as guidance for 
managers in their partner selection decisions. Finally, we look at a particular industry in a 
particular geographical region. In order to assess whether generalization is possible future 
research should investigate partner selection criteria in different industrial and geographi-
cal settings.  
   
7. CONCLUSION 
 
Alliances may fail for a variety of reasons but a key factor influencing their performance 
is the partner selection. This is true even if the firm does not enter into an alliance, as 
partner selection works both to select the appropriate partners but also to dismiss the in-
appropriate (Makadok, 2001). So how should a firm decide on whom to ally with when 
entering an emerging market? Contemporary theory focuses on existing resource 
strengths and weaknesses of firms. Hitt et al. (2000: 464) argues that their resource-based 
explanation “puts in another piece of the puzzle of international strategic alliances”. 
This is no doubt true. However, correspondence between theoretical prescriptions and 
managerial practice does not solve the puzzle in terms of what firms should do. In fact, in 
the light of the high failure rate of strategic alliances, studies of what firms actually do 
may provide insight about what firms should not do. When alliance managers act in ac-
cordance with theoretical prescriptions, and alliance performance continues to be dissatis-
factory, some pieces of the puzzle must still be missing. We find that the resource-based 
view offers a too simplistic approach to partner selection and that this approach may re-
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sult in firms selecting inappropriate partners and dismissing the appropriate. We argue 
that critical resources are not prerequisites for alliance formation and may not even form 
the primary reason. Rather, we advance an evolutionary approach that includes an as-
sessment of the importance of both resource endowments and aspiration levels over time. 
This approach implies that it at times actually may be beneficial for firms to ally with 
weak partners. (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002) (Utterback & Kim, 1986) 
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